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August 7, 2005 The Disengagement and the Palestinians By: Gershon Baskin*
Special to AMIN There is no doubt that the Israeli disengagement has created some serious dilemmas and problems for the Palestinians. First, this is a unilateral step by Israel designed at a time when Israel declared that there was no partner. It was launched by Sharon to take attention away from Geneva and a much wider internationally supported campaign for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Sharon has claimed a space in the international community as a political hero, previously perceived there as a demon. Now leaders from the entire world are waiting on line to meet him.
Despite the international support that
Sharon has received, the disengagement is perceived by most people as an
attempt by Sharon to give away Gaza in order to tighten his grip on the
West Bank. It is not clear if Gaza will really be detached from Israel –
whether Palestinians will be able to move freely between Gaza and the West
Bank – between the two parts of Palestine which are legally perceived to
be one integrative territory. It is not clear if Israel will withdraw from
the Gaza-Egypt border, whether a seaport will be allowed to function,
whether the Gaza airport will be allowed to work, and many other open
questions.
In the north of the West Bank it is
unclear if Israel will turn over the vacated territory, roughly 2.5 times
the size of Gaza, to the Palestinian Authority, transforming it into area
“a” and under full Palestinian control, or if Israel will continue to hold
full control and prevent Palestinians from moving freely in the area.
For the sake of argument, or for
strategic game-playing, let us assume for a moment that Israel will
completely withdraw from Gaza and that they will relinquish all control
over Gaza, its international borders, its airspace, its land and it
natural resources. If that is the case, Israel will claim that the
occupation over Gaza has ended. At that point, a vacuum of sovereignty
will exist, and while Israel was never sovereign in Gaza, the question
must be raised of whether or not the Palestinian Authority becomes the
sovereign power and if that sovereignty is translated into statehood. There is no need to declare a Palestinian State, that was done on November 15, 1988 and more than 100 countries recognized that state. Of those who did not recognize the State were all of the original 13 EU countries, the United States, Canada and Israel. The Palestinians could re-issue their Declaration of Independence, adding a chapter on borders indicating that the borders of the State are the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as the Capital of Palestine. A declaration as such would in fact be helpful to any future peace process. It sets in stone, so to speak, the price of peace that Israel must pay and it removes any doubts about Palestinian plans for expanding the State into Israeli territory.
Palestine must then gain full membership
in the United Nations and Mahmoud Abbas should call on Israel to recognize
the State of Palestine and even co-sponsor the resolution for UN
Membership. If Israel did recognize the new State, there is no doubt that
the United States would as well. Even without Israeli recognition, there
is a chance that the United States would, and even without US recognition,
the rest of the world would recognize Palestine and establish embassies in
a provisional capital.
In the Twelfth Session of the Palestine
National Council in Cairo in 1974, a resolution was passed stating that
the Palestinians would establish their state in any part of Palestine
liberated from Israel. After 1974 this became the policy of the mainstream
of the Palestinian National Movement. If Gaza is to become completed
liberated from Israeli occupation, it is incumbent on the Palestinians to
claim sovereignty there and to create real statehood as the first stage of
enacting the Palestinian state in all of the declared territories within
its borders. In the absence of Israeli control over Gaza, Palestinians
must claim sovereignty and must rule there as a State. This is not the end
of the struggle and a Palestinian State established first in Gaza does not
in any way prevent the Palestinians from working towards the complete
fulfillment of their sovereignty in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Many Palestinians fear that if they adopt
this strategy they will end up with a State in Gaza only. They fear that
the international community will forget about the Palestinian issue and
that the occupation by Israel of the West Bank will be strengthened.
This, in my opinion is highly unlikely. If the sides do not get back to
the negotiating table in the framework of the Road Map or in the framework
of permanent status negotiations, we are likely to see additional Israeli
unilateral disengagements.
If Israel is wise, it will return to the
negotiating table, however; due to the complete absence of trust between
the parties, this is unlikely. A peaceful disengagement and a successful
Palestinian take over of Gaza will help to build trust between the sides.
Perhaps not enough trust to return to permanent status negotiations, but
enough to bring about a second, but coordinated disengagement.
It is quite clear that the majority of
Israelis and Palestinians perceive the first disengagement as a
reward to violence and that Hamas is presenting itself to the public as
the party that secured the Israeli evacuation. This was a real lost
opportunity by Israel to strengthen the leadership of Abu Mazen. Had
Sharon announced the disengagement after meeting with Abu Mazen, it would
be perceived as a victory for moderation and negotiations.
A second disengagement must be done in
coordination with Abu Mazen directly in the picture. If not, a second
disengagement could lead to a third intifada. The next disengagement will
likely be from all of the settlements east of the Israeli separation
barrier – walls and fences. Here we are speaking about a minimum of
80,000 settlers in some 60 settlements. This falls short of what
Palestinians want and it will be a clear attempt by Israeli to cement the
separation barriers as a permanent border. Nonetheless, the second
disengagement should be embraced by the Palestinians and supported in any
way possible. The Israeli taboo on removing settlements has been broken
by the first disengagement and the Palestinians must encourage the
Israelis to continue dismantling more and more settlements. The best chances for moving forward and for ensuring additional further Israeli withdrawals and disengagements is for the Palestinians to claim statehood and sovereignty and to behave like a state. As a responsible member of the international community, backed by UN Membership, Palestine will be free to enter into international treaties and conventions. Palestine will be free to call upon the United Nations to dispatch United Nations peace keepers to its borders in order to prevent an Israeli incursion into its territory. Palestine can be a free agent and can work on behalf of all of its citizens and territories, even if it still does not have full control over all of the areas of the State. This is all completely feasible and possible if Palestine behaves like a responsible State. This means that Palestine must enforce law and order. It means that there cannot be any militia or unauthorized weapons being used by groups of citizens. It means that stopping the armed struggle or the armed resistance becomes a Palestinian imperative and a supreme matter of Palestinian national strategic interests.
The surest way to advance the process of
creating the Palestinian State in all of the West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem is for the State of Palestine to exist as a state dedicated to
providing security, prosperity and peace for its own citizens. Even if the
State of Palestine is not created as part of a negotiated process, a
process of coordinated unilateralism is completely possible. In fact, this
might be the fastest and surest way to advance the cause of freedom and
liberation for Palestine and for Israeli-Palestinian peace. * Gershon Baskin, is the founder and the Israeli Co-Director of IPCRI - Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information- Jerusalem.
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