Negotiating the Settlements:
The Success of
Right-Wing
Political Entrapment Against Peace
Gershon Baskin, Ph.D.
The
Israeli media reported that Ehud Barak made the most “generous offer” the
Palestinians could ever expect to receive from an Israeli Prime Minster.
Furthermore, the Israeli hasbara
(propaganda) machine blamed Arafat for “not missing the opportunity to
miss another opportunity”. Mr. Barak claimed that the Palestinians didn’t even
offer a counter offer or even respond to the Israeli offer. A central part of the Israeli “package”
of offers included, as reported by Zeev Schiff in Haaretz, was 90% of the West
Bank – the remaining 10% to be annexed to Israel. Mr. Barak claimed that he would receive the support of the
majority of settlers because 80% would remain where they are and would be under
Israel sovereignty. Only some 40,000 settlers would have to relocate into the
so-called “settlement blocs” that would be annexed. Sounds almost reasonable. Yet the Palestinian rejection was
swift and firm and in fact, served as one of the primary motivating forces that
led to the intensity of the “al-Aqsa intifida”.
Palestinians
who were at Camp David speak about a new concept in the Israeli-Palestinian
lexicon that was born “up on the hill” with the help of planners and map
experts brought in to interpret the positions and problems presented by both
sides. The new concept is: settlement clusters. As opposed to “settlement blocs” – concentrated Israeli settlements
alongside the Green Line which could be annexed to the pre-1967 borders, the
concept of “settlement clusters” refers to groups of more isolated settlements
in the heart of the Palestinian territories becoming islands of Israeli
sovereignty once annexed by Israel.
The Israeli 90% - 10% offer to the Palestinians included a number of
these settlement clusters. This reality also meant that about 40 Palestinian
villages with about 80,000 Palestinians would also be annexed to Israel. The Palestinian’s top urban planner was
rushed to Camp David by Arafat to interpret the Israeli offer that the
Americans were pressuring the Palestinians to accept. The Americans and the Israelis told the Palestinians that
this was the best possible offer and that Barak had done the maximum. Barak, they explained, would have to
withdraw more than 40 settlements and more than 40,000 settlers. Any additional compromise would bring
down his government and then “Arafat can negotiate with Sharon and Bibi”.
In
Palestinian eyes, the Barak offer created not islands of Israeli sovereignty
but a series of at least three Palestinian “sovereign cages”. There would be no
real Palestinian territorial contiguity.
They would not have control and sovereignty on main arteries of
transportation. The Jordan Valley
would still be controlled by the IDF – even if the Palestinians were granted
some kind of control there. The only part of the Israeli proposal that seemed
acceptable to the Palestinians was their understanding that Barak was willing
to remove all of the settlements from Gaza, including Gush Katif, however, it
was not clear whether Barak was willing to “allow” the Palestinians to have a
sovereign border crossing with Egypt in Rafah. (After Camp David it became less
clear whether in fact Barak had actually offered to remove all of the Gaza
settlements – where they still control about 30% of the Gaza Strip).
Throughout
the negotiations the Palestinians constantly reminded themselves, the Americans
and the Israelis that according to Oslo the agreement signed in Washington in
September 1995, Israel was supposed to implement further redeployment of its
forces (and control) to “specified military locations”. The mutual Israeli-Palestinian
understanding of this at that time included the Israeli settlements within the
definition of “specified military locations”. According to the Palestinians, by the end of the interim
period (5 years) Israel should have withdrawn from 90% of the West Bank – based
on a signed and endorsed agreement. The Palestinians believed that the area of
the settlements included only the built up areas – allowing for a perimeter of
50 meters from the last home in each settlement. This together with IDF bases would amount to about 10% of
the West Bank. However, an
argument then emerged when Benyamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister. Israel then claimed that the agreement
referred to “security zones” and not “specified military locations” – a much
broader definition allowing Israel to decide unilaterally that the further redeployments
would be much less than the Palestinian demands. Netanyahu’s office produced a Hebrew version of the Oslo
Agreement talking about “azorim bitchoniim” – security zones. At the same time, the Israeli Foreign
Ministry produced an internal document labeled “Secret – Limited
Distribution” with the correct translation of the term “specified military
locations” claiming that the Palestinian interpretation was the correct
version.
Mr.
Barak decided even before being elected that he would “merge” the third further
redeployment with the final status agreement and thereby avoid making
unnecessary concessions to the Palestinians. In other words – there would be no
further redeployment that the Palestinians expected to include at least 50% of
the West Bank. Barak believed that
after Netanyahu, his “generous” offer would be viewed by the Palestinians as
their version of getting their state “on a silver platter”. The Palestinian
refusal was incomprehensible – how could they refuse? Who will possibly give them a better deal?
The
Palestinians have claimed since Oslo in 1993 that they had made their “historic
compromise” by giving up 78% of Palestine – leaving them with only the West
Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.
They believed that Israel would make their “historic compromise” in the
final status negotiations when they withdraw from 100% of the West Bank, East
Jerusalem and Gaza – allowing for minor border rectification and taking into
account some of the new realities on the ground. Taking into account some of the “new realities” led Arafat
to offer Barak 2% of the West Bank “for free” and another 2% in exchange for
territory of equal size and quality inside of Israel. The Palestinians’
position has been based on their demand to implement UN Security Council
Resolution 242 (according to their understanding) meaning a full Israeli
withdrawal from all territories conquered in 1967. Arafat’s agreement to give up 2% “for free” led to a deep
rift within the Palestinian delegation.
Unofficial reports even spoke of a “fist fight” that broke out between
at least 2 of the delegates from the Palestinian team. If this was the height of the intensity
of dissatisfaction within the Palestinian delegation, then it should have been
taken for granted by Israel and the Americans that the Palestinian public would
“explode” at the notion of having to “take it or leave it” with regard to the
Israel “generous” offer.
In
public opinion surveys conducted amongst Palestinian following Camp David it
was found that the highest level of dissatisfaction and anger by the Palestinian
public was demonstrated with regard to the territorial issue and the settlement
issue. The Palestinians have seen
the rapid expansion of settlements and roads during the past 17 months of the
Barak government. For
Palestinians, the reality of settlements means being in perpetual occupation –
the idea of political separation becomes little more than a farce.
The
Israeli peace camp always objected to the building of settlements. From the very beginning of the
settlement movement the peace camp in Israel was out on the streets
protesting. I remember tens of
those demonstrations – the most dramatic of them – for me – being the
demonstration in Efrat on a cold rainy Saturday before the first person had
even moved in. The reality of the
amount of money, roads, infrastructure and houses built was impossible to
ignore. I remember saying “we’re
carrying signs and they’re building” – what a feeling of impotence! The Israeli left knew that the
settlements were and obstacle to peace – even the Americans said so. So why
then, did the peace camp adopt the line of even “liberals” in the Likud and
most center people in Labour that the settlements were a reality – a fact on
the ground that couldn’t be changed.
How is that the peace camp in Israel became the “defense attorney” for
the settlers and settlements vis-a vis the Palestinians?
Throughout
the negotiations over the years, most Israelis have accepted the viewpoint
regarding the irrelevance of international law expressed so eloquently by
Ben-Gurion “Um – schmoom” – meaning “UN – nonsense!”. Who cares that building settlements is a blatant breach of
international law? Who cares that the “progressive” Supreme Court of Israel has
consistently rejected the notion that it must consider international law – its
mandate is only within the framework of Israeli jurisprudence.
It
now seems after a total break-down and perhaps permanent collapse of the Oslo
Process that the slogan “settlements means no peace” is a reality. It does seem almost impossible to imagine
any Israeli government willing to remove more settlements than Barak
offered. The Palestinians want to
replace the Americans who blamed them for the failure of Camp David. The desire to demand international
intervention, protection and even mediation is not tactical – it is
strategic. They know that
international law is on their side.
It seems that their strategy also includes a Hizballah type of war of
attrition on specific isolated Israeli settlements in order to demonstrate
their high cost to Israeli interests. It is not by chance that Netzerim, Kfar
Darom, Psgaot, Kadim and Ganim have become targets during this new intifada.
The
curse of the settlements will cost Israel and Palestine peace – at least for
the foreseeable future. The religious and historical attraction of Jews to the
heart land of the West Bank – the cradle of our birth as a nation – should not
have prevented us from visiting there as welcome tourists in a Palestinian
state. Once again it is being
proven that Jewish attraction to stones is apparently more sacred than human
life and that our historic rights and heritage is of a higher value than others
and far beyond the importance of international law. One day – perhaps, it will
be written that 180,000 Jewish settlers prevented peace for millions of
Israelis and Palestinians. How
tragic.