Under the public radar and due
to extreme amounts of skepticism, George Mitchell’s mediation
efforts continue without public debate or concern. The silence
is because almost no one believes they will be constructive, and
the media blackout imposed by Mitchell.
Four rounds of talks have taken place. The parameters have been
set, the process has begun, and now it is time to get serious.
The proximity talks can
produce agreements; this is how I think they should proceed:
• Intensive negotiations: Talks conducted twice a month are not
going to produce an agreement. The best model for proximity
talks is Camp David I between Egypt and Israel. Convening
intensive talks, even if not face-to-face, in an isolated
location for at least five days at a time is the way to move.
The initial talks will not involve the principals – Binyamin
Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – but the lead negotiators and
technical assistants. The process must now move into an
intensive phase.
• The parameters: The goal of the proximity talks is to advance
a permanent-status agreement which will put an end to the
conflict. The core issues – borders, security, Jerusalem and
refugees – are all on the table. Israel’s preference is to deal
with security prior to setting borders; the Palestinians’
preference is to first deal with borders.
It is essential to deal with borders so that we can put the
issue of settlements to rest. Once a border is agreed to, Israel
can continue to build in all the settlements that will be
incorporated into it.
All of the core issues are linked and cannot be dealt with apart
from each other. Palestinian leaders have said they will accept
any reasonable Israeli demands regarding security. Their two
main reservations are predictability – security arrangements
cannot be left to the discretion of the sergeant at the
checkpoint – and no Israeli military presence within the
Palestinian state.
A SENIOR White House official made an unreported 24- hour visit
to Jerusalem two weeks ago to explore with Netanyahu his
constraints on moving forward. The main issue raised by
Netanyahu was his demand that the eastern border of the
Palestinian state be sealed hermetically from smuggling of
weapons, ammunition and terrorists so that the West Bank would
not turn into the Gaza Strip – a front line of Islamic terrorism
against Israel. Netanyahu’s view is that only the IDF can ensure
this but it is unacceptable to the Palestinians.
The paradigm of any security agreements must be that each side
is responsible for its own security. In Oslo the paradigm was
that the Palestinian Authority forces would prevent attacks
against Israel, while Israel withdrew from territories that
would come under PA control.
From the Palestinian point of view, Israel failed to withdraw
from all the territories which they understood would be the
basis for their state, and instead settlement building
accelerated. In their eyes, the PA security apparatus became
collaborators with the ongoing occupation, which explains the
vigor with which those forces joined the second intifada.
From Israel’s point of view, the PA failed in its security
mission by design and by ideology, and in response it withheld
further redeployments. However you look at it, what happened
must be avoided when reaching new agreements.
Palestinians must be held responsible for the security of their
external borders. A multinational force led by the US must be
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the security
responsibilities of the parties. This force must also have the
mandate and capacity to “do the job” if the parties fail to
implement those obligations. A reasonable proposal, at least for
the first few years, would be to integrate unarmed Israeli
observers in specific positions along the eastern border of
Palestine, under US command.
While dealing with security arrangements the discussion of
borders must be advanced. Abbas has indicated to President
Barack Obama that the Palestinians would be willing to consider
enlarging the size of the territories Israel would annex to
place the main settlement blocks under its sovereignty under the
condition of territorial swaps on a 1:1 basis. So far Israel has
agreed to the principle but not to the 1:1 formula. I have
suggested to the Mitchell team that the talks delineating the
border begin by Israel presenting a map of the “swap
territories.”
• Delineating the border brings us to Jerusalem. The talks on
Jerusalem should be separated into three different issues – the
territorial dimension of the city outside of the Old City, the
Old City and the Temple Mount/Haram al- Sharif. It should be
determined from the outset that Jerusalem will be an open city,
not one divided by walls and fences. Outside of the Old City
walls, political division of the city is necessary so that each
people will live under its own sovereignty.
Regarding the Old City, there are a number of possibilities for
dealing with the less than one square kilometer.
Talking about Jerusalem will automatically lead to the
discussion of the refugee issue. It is understood that there are
trade-offs on the various issues to reach a package deal. There
is a trade-off between Jerusalem and refugees where Palestinians
get sovereignty over Palestinian Jerusalem and control over the
Haram al-Sharif, which they effectively already control, (Israel
will retain control over the Western Wall) and the right of
return of refugees is mainly to the Palestinian state. The
Palestinians transform the concept of “return to home” into
“return to homeland” meaning the Palestinian state.
All the above is possible, but predicated on three main elements
– that the settlement freeze continues beyond September 26, that
the security situation remains calm, and security cooperation
and continued Palestinian deployment continues concurrent with
Israeli redeployment out of Palestinian-controlled areas and
that after the November elections in the US, President Obama
takes control of the process.
The writer is co-CEO of the
Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (www.ipcri.org),
and an elected member of the leadership of the Green Movement
political party.