Thursday, October 19, 2000
Dear friends,
For all of those who are interested to know how we have been facing the
current situation, the following is a bit of an update and a bit of analysis
on the present situation. This
analysis is my own and although, to a great extent it is shared by Zakaria,
he is not here right and and I will not speak on his behalf – but from extensive
discussions of the situation – I believe that we pretty much see eye-to-eye
(which is quite different from most Israelis and Palestinians who are talking
about “eye for eye”).
Getting to the IPCRI office in Bethlehem can only be done now by taking
considerable personal physical risk.
On Wednesday of last week, one day before the lynch of the Israeli
soldiers in Ramallah, I was stopped at a Palestinian check point in Bethlehem
and told to wait in front of the check point. Within minutes about 6 young men in civilian dress holding
weapons surrounded my car and began interrogating me. I explained to them
who I was and that I had an office in Bethlehem. I gave them my ID and asked to use my phone. I called Zakaria, who was in the office
and he spoke to the officer there. The
officer told Zakaria that they were taking me to the headquarters of the Preventative
Security in Bethlehem – something that I didn’t want to happen.
Zakaria immediately began searching for some of the Palestinian security
chiefs while I convinced the officer not to take me there but the call the
head of Preventative security for Bethlehem – who was in our office just 2
days before.All of this conversation taking place in my less than perfect
Arabic. During the next 15-20 minutes (that felt like hours) I was held there
on the side of the road with 6 Palestinian armed soldiers telling me I shouldn’t
be afraid – I kept telling myself that I shouldn’t be afraid as well (it only
worked partially). Finally a
call came from the head of Preventative Security for the Bethlehem area.
The officer asked if I was from IPCRI – I said yes. He reported back
and closed the phone. He then gave me back my ID Card and told
me that he had instructions to escort me wherever I needed to go. I was leaving Bethlehem so I received
a military escort out of the city – until the Israeli check point in Beit
Jalla.
The next morning we decided that I would travel into the office with Zakaria
in his car. There was a complete closure on the territories and the entrance
of Israelis to the PA areas was forbidden. Under normal circumstances when there is a closure there are
about 200 ways in and out of Bethlehem – and we know all of them. We had been using some of them since the
beginning of the latest uprising to come and go to the office. However, on Thursday morning, every entrance
was blocked. The Israeli army
had dug ditches in the roads and placed huge boulders and dirt at every entrance.
I remembered that a school in our Peace Education program has an entrance
on a road that was open and also has a back door into Beit Jalla on a road
that leads directly to our office. We
spoke with the headmaster of the school who said that we could leave Zakaria’s
car in the school. We then called
our landlord in Bethlehem to pick us up at the school. Our landlord’s uncle is the commander of PA Military Intelligence
in the Bethlehem district and is very well known. All of the roads in Beit Jalla and Bethlehem
were filled with Palestinian soldiers awaiting an Israeli invasion.
We made it to the office without any problem.
At 11:00 we received a phone call from someone in Ramallah that 2 Israeli
soldiers were captured and killed there just a few minutes ago. At 11:45 there were the first reports
on the incident on the internet. At
12:30 the Israeli radio reported the incident without any great detail. It
was still quite unclear what had happened there. At about 1:15 we saw Palestinian soldiers
leaving the Bethlehem military headquarters in full gear and carrying lots
of equipment. They entered the
olive fields around our office that are across from their headquarters. Several
minutes later we heard on Palestinian radio that the Israelis said that they
would be attacking Palestinian military installations in Ramallah and in other
places. Shortly afterwards, several friends of IPCRI from the area came to
our office and told us that it was time to leave – they got no argument from
us. We called our landlord who
swiftly returned us to the school. Zakaria,
Birgit (our office manager) and I went to my house in Jerusalem for a cup
of coffee and to see the news on TV. When the first attack by Israeli helicopters took place Zakaria
was clearly nervous and felt that tempters were so high he better get home
as soon as possible so that he wouldn’t get caught in a lynch by angry Israelis.
He got home in about 15 minutes and I called him to make sure that
he was safe and that nothing happened to him on the way home.
So now the office is off limits until things calm down. Fortunately we have an Israeli teachers
training taking place that began yesterday and will go on until tomorrow.
It is a great testimony of commitment and hope that this teacher training
is even taking place. Our Peace
Education staff of Marwan Daweish, Anat Resiman-Levy, and Nedal Jayousi earn
a great deal of credit for making this happen as do the 60 Israeli Jewish
and Arab teachers who are participating.
Unfortunately, the Palestinian teachers could not participate due to
the closure. Nonetheless it is quite difficult to talk
about peace education when the ground is burning. A major part of the training is aimed
to allow the teachers to talk about the situation and to try and understand
what is actually happening and why. It is also aimed at allowing them to vent
their anger and fears.
What else have we been doing?
We have been involved in organizing meetings between Israeli and Palestinian
politicians aimed at keeping channels of communication open. The Most important
of these attempts was a meeting we organized between Avshalom (Abu) Vilan
and Musi Raz from Meretz and a senior Palestinian security personality on
Sunday night October 1 – three days after the Sharon visit to Al Aqsa. Abu Vilan is very close to Barak having served as an officer
under him in the past. Abu brought a message from Barak to Arafat and requested
to deliver it to the Palestinian security officer and we were requested to
organize the meeting. At one point in the meeting we had Barak on one phone
and Arafat on the other. Abu Vilan asked the Palestinian security
officer what Arafat wanted to put an end to the violence. The Palestinian
security officer called Arafat and was dictated a list of seven conditions.
They mainly focused on returning to the situation that existed prior
to the events as well as a demand to establish an international investigation
to examine the events of the riots and deaths on the Haram el Sharif-Temple
Mount after the Sharon visit and after the Friday prayers. Six of the seven conditions were acceptable to Barak. There was full objection to any international
involvement in examining what happened. Barak’s office also wanted to check the information from another
channel that opened up ½ an hour before our call to Barak. The Palestinian security officer proposed
a Barak-Arafat meeting right there to reach an agreement and put an immediate
end to the escalation. Barak
refused and instead sent his confidante – former deputy director of the Shin
Bet and Arafat’s business partner – Yossi Ginosar (Known to the Palestinians
as Joe) to meet Arafat. The Ginosar-Arafat
meeting turned out as a disaster with mutual screaming and recriminations.
We pleaded with Barak’s office to accept the offer for the meeting we tried
to arrange because he was all ready to make the preparations to bring Arafat
to his office. Barak was in Cochav Yair in his private residence.
All that is now history.
It seems very unlikely that the Sharm el Sheikh declaration will take hold
and be implemented. The declaration
is extremely unpopular on the Palestinian streets where most people believe
that they have paid a very high price for a very small return. It will be
very difficult for Arafat to impose his will (if in fact his will is to bring
about quiet) on the forces in the streets – both those from Fatah and those
from the opposition Islamic groups. It seems to me that Arafat’s strategy
is based on his conclusion that the Israeli offers from Camp David fell far
short of what Arafat believes he could accept and sell to his people and to
the Arab and Islamic world – particularly concerning the Haram al Sharif and
the refugees’ right of return. The Palestinian position since November 1988
has been based on the claim that they have accepted international law and
Security Council Resolutions and that the international community has to insure
their implementation in the face of Israeli violations and disrespect of the
international community. In Oslo
in 1993, the Palestinians said that they have made an historic compromise
and that in the final status talks Israel would have to make its historic
compromise. The Palestinians refer to their acceptance of the State of Israel
within the June 4, 1967 borders – meaning that they have given up their claim
to 78% of historic Palestine – but they would not make any compromises on
the remaining 22%. In Camp David,
Barak proposed to withdraw from 90% of the West Bank. Arafat offered Barak
2% for free and another 2% in land exchanges. This was a very unpopular move by Arafat amongst Fatah activists
and Tanzim (the former leaders of the fatah during the years of the intifida
who come from the West Bank and Gaza) leaders. In fact a fistfight broke out
between members of the Palestinian delegation at Camp David over this issue.
Arafat has always wanted the international community to act in Palestine
as they acted in Iraq (Kuwait) and in Kosovo. Furthermore, he was inspired by the lessons of the Hizballah
victory in bringing about an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon through
a guerilla war of attrition. In this few, some 2000 Hizballah fighters defeated
the mighty Israeli army. Why can’t Palestinian resistance target key sensitive
places such as Rachel’s Tomb, Joseph’s tomb, Netzarim, Kfar Darom, Psagot
and other isolated places in the same way that Hizballah did? Recognizing
the difference between every other place in the world and Israel, Arafat believes
that without great Palestinian casualties the world will not take notice of
the need to intervene and impose international law on Israel. Arafat wants the international community
to send troops to Palestine to protect the Palestinian people and to force
Israel to accept Security Council Resolution 242. Understanding this strategy is also the
main reason for the strong Israeli objection to the international investigation
panel which would have given an official entry into the region and could lead
to further international intervention.
At Camp David, one of the Israeli proposals for Jerusalem involved the
establishment of a small synagogue on the Haram al Sharif in exchange for
some form of dejure Islamic control (not Palestinian). At the same time Israeli
newspapers reported that the chief Rabbinate in Israel was examining Jewish
law with regard to the issue of holding Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount. When Sharon announced his intention to
visit the Temple Mount, rumors began to spread throughout Palestine that the
Israelis were planning to take over Al Aqsa and to divide it between Jews
and Muslims as the Cave of the Patriarchs is in Hebron. Barak agreed to Sharon’s
visit for internal Israeli political reasons and thereby led to the catalyst
that set the region on fire. There
was clearly a lack of understanding of the intensity of Islamic sensitivities
and fears regarding the Haram al Sharif.
There was also a lack of understanding of the frustration of the Palestinians
on the ground and the fears of losing their rights through compromises in
the peace negotiations.
Another very basic problem in my view emanates from the lack of democracy
in Palestine and the tragic relationship that has developed between Israel
and the Arafat regime serving the very narrow and short-sighted interests
of a small group of people on both sides. The dwindling support for Arafat amongst Palestinians is a
reflection of the contempt that most Palestinians feel towards the Palestinian
authority and Arafat and towards the Oslo Process. This also reflects limits
that Arafat has had in getting the public into the streets to support him
in the past as well as the limitations that he now faces on trying to control
the streets. Israel and the US
hold a lot of responsibility for the nature of the PA regime – the subject
of which I will devote another letter.
Where to from here?
It seems to me that there will not be a complete reduction of violence
and that the potential for terror is very high. There will most likely be new elections in Israel and a very
weakened Barak has little chance of winning. It seems that in recognition
of the fact that Israelis and Palestinians will continue to live here, Israel
is likely to take unilateral steps towards forced separation while the Palestinians
will take unilateral steps towards sovereignty and statehood. The two sides
will try to find a modus vivendi of regulating varying levels of violence
between them.
IPCRI will continue to reevaluate the situation to examine ways to keep
communication and dialogue open. We are now trying to get the US Ambassador
to host a series of high level meetings in his home which we would facilitate.
If this will not work, we will approach several EU Ambassadors to do
the same.
We appreciate your support and interest and will keep you informed of our
activities.
Gershon