Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have finally
been renewed. Even though the current round of talks is not
direct, the parties are dealing with the core issues with the
goal of reaching a permanent status agreement at some point.
According to news reports, the first topics on the agenda are
borders and security arrangements, both of which will rapidly
lead to negotiations on Jerusalem and refugees.
If the parties are successful in reaching an agreement, it will
be a package of concessions and compromises that will lead to
the end of the occupation, the creation of a Palestinian state
with two capitals in Jerusalem, the right of return being
implemented primarily in the Palestinian state, full peace and
the end of all claims.
When Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu voiced his support for
the two-state solution at Bar-Ilan University last June, he
said: “Yes, but.”
The “buts” that he mentioned included the direct security
threats that a sovereign Palestinian state might pose. Netanyahu
stated that Palestinian control over external borders and
airspace could present a real strategic threat to Israel. The
Palestinian leaders, US President Barack Obama and the heads of
the Quartet must say to Netanyahu: yes, we recognize these
threats and agree that they are real, but the answer to them
cannot be continued occupation or control of a future
Palestine’s external borders or airspace.
IN THE framework of a peace agreement, there will be no Israeli
troops present in the Palestinian state, but this is no reason
to prevent its creation. Palestinians also have real and
legitimate threat perceptions regarding the behaviors and
intentions of Israel. Both parties, along with the international
community, must treat all of these concerns with the utmost
sincerity and seriousness.
The key to advancing a viable agreement will be the mechanism
developed to monitor and verify its implementation, especially
on security issues. Past failures teach us that bilateral
assurances, again especially on security matters, are
insufficient. Objectively there is almost no reason why Israelis
and Palestinians should trust each other. Both sides have
systematically breached significant obligations of the Oslo
agreements, which contained no mechanisms for third party
monitoring, verification, compliance, enforcement, or dispute
resolution.
The road map process did include a monitoring mechanism and
today there is a road map monitor (US Lt.-Gen. Paul Selva), but
the process is secretive and there is no accountability of the
Israeli and Palestinian leaders to their people built into it.
We already have so much collective knowledge about the
Israeli-Palestinian track, there is no good reason to repeat the
same mistakes.
SINCE THE end of the Cold War, the UN and the international
community have played a large role in the development and
implementation of peace accords. This has been accompanied by a
tendency to develop complex multifaceted peace arrangements that
include a wide variety of military and political tasks.
Similarly, verification arrangements are increasingly included
in peace arrangements and such tasks are often assigned to the
UN or to other international actors.
Israelis and Palestinians have grown justifiably suspicious
about the role of third parties. The idea of UN forces as
peacekeepers has no legitimacy in Israel where everyone uses the
less than satisfactory model of UNIFIL to discredit the idea. In
Palestine the example of the Temporary International Presence in
Hebron, instituted after the massacre committed by Baruch
Goldstein, is used to demonstrate the clear ineffectiveness of a
third party force.
There are many examples of third party interventions that can be
used as tools for learning, both successful and less successful
models. In the end, both the Israelis and the Palestinians will
have to agree on the mechanism and structure that best fits
their specific needs and and addresses their threats.
We already know that the mandate of any peacekeeping force will
have to be extremely detailed and explicit. The force will have
to be composed of credible participants who cannot be bribed to
turn a blind eye to violations. Members of such a force must
also be well trained, intelligent, multicultural and lingual.
The force must have a unified command structure leading up to a
US general and administrator. The force will be engaged
primarily in monitoring and verification of treaty obligations,
but it must also have clear “rules of engagement” that will
enable it and even obligate it to use force, if and when
necessary. There must also be a trilateral
Israeli-Palestinian-international joint command center to
coordinate, mitigate and resolve in real time any emerging
problems.
It is obvious that Israelis and Palestinians don’t trust each
other. If they did, there would be no need for a third party
mediator and there would be no need for international
participation in the implementation of future agreements. The
reality is that there can be no agreement without the direct
international involvement. Recognizing this fact is the first
significant step towards reaching a full peace agreement.
The writer is the co-CEO of
the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information
(www.ipcri.org) and an elected member of the leadership of
Israel’s Green Movement political party.
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