Jewish New Year 2002 - The Second Anniversary of the Intifada
By Ben Kaspit. Part I: Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002
** When the Intifada Erupted, it was finally clear to all: Israel is Not a
State with an Army but an Army with a State **
It happened about three weeks after the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada:
General Amos Malka, head of Israel's Military Intelligence [AMAN. AK] was
visiting the Central District Command. The District Intelligence officer was
then Yosi Kopperwasser (today head of AMAN's Research Division). "Tell me,"
Malka said to Kopperwasser, "how many bullets has the IDF fired since the
beginning of the Intifada?"
Kopperwasser was dumbfounded. He did not have a clue. Malka asked him to find
out. When the answer arrived by noon, most of the officers who were present,
according to an eye witness, turned white. In the first few days of the
Intifada, the IDF fired about 700,000 bullets and other projectiles in Judea
and Samaria [the West Bank - AK] and about 300,000 in Gaza. All told, about a
million bullets and other projectiles were used. Someone in the Central Command
later quipped that the project should be named "a bullet for every child." This
astronomical number evinces the facts on the ground.
A picture is worth a thousand words, but a million projectiles are stronger and
deadlier than a picture. Here's an illustration of the same point: Nabil Shaath
[then Palestinian Authority Minister for Planning and > International
Cooperation - AK] who was hosting a European visitor on a
tour of the Gaza Strip tried to demonstrate to him how aggressive the IDF was.
He asked his bodyguard to draw his hand gun and fire a single shot in the air.
The entire IDF line erupted in response. The IDF returned fire using dozens of
weapons, including tanks. The hellish shooting continued unabated for two
hours: rifles, machines guns, heavy machine guns, personal anti-tank weapons and
what not. A heavy incessant barrage of firepower, all in response to a single
handgun bullet.
Incidentally, this story does not originate with Nabil Shaath. The story is
well known to sources in the Israeli army. Similar cases were documented over
the area up and down the region. For many years, the Israeli Defense Forces had
been preparing for this Intifada and when it erupted, the IDF unleashed its
prolonged frustration on the Palestinians, who did not know what hit them.
Initially, the events were dubbed "Tunnel Plus" [a reference to the 1996
incident when Palestinian anger erupted over Israel's opening of an ancient
tunnel near Jerusalem's Al Aqsa mosque - AK]. It was seen as nothing more than
a minor obligatory phase in the Palestinian national struggle for statehood. No
one, whether on our side or theirs, could have imagined that the [second]
Intifada would last two years, would exact thousands of fatalities (more than
615 of them Israelis), with no end in sight (in spite of visible signs of
fatigue).
Some government and security officials believe that perhaps the IDF's
destructive response and the blow inflicted on the Palestinians during the first
weeks were directly responsible for the deteriorating situation and the
escalation that followed. During those weeks, Israel took very few casualties,
in contrast with numerous Palestinian dead and wounded. The ratio [between
Israeli and Palestinian casualties - AK] was initially 1 to 20, then 2 to 40
[sic]. By early October, 75 Palestinians had been killed, compared to 4
Israelis.
"What's the matter with you?!" high Palestinian officials asked their Israeli
counterparts. "You are breaking all the rules of the game!" The IDF continued
shooting, using mainly snipers. The shock on the Palestinian side intensified
and a murderous "blood ledger" was created. The highest Palestinian interest
was now to inflict Israeli casualties, to "achieve parity," to take revenge.
The rest is well known. IDF commanders solemnly swear repeatedly that the army
tried its best to contain the events and respond with precision and discretion.
However, the data and the results on the ground point to a different reality.
** Deputy Minister Sneh Can't Take it Anymore **
Deputy Defense Minister, Efraim Sneh, who was appointed by Prime Minister and
Defense Minister Ehud Barak to be responsible for improving Palestinian
conditions, was able to observe the Army's thoughtlessly brutal policy first
hand. Sneh was repeatedly finding himself in adventures where it turned out
that clear, written instructions from the political echelons, usually coming
from the government or the Prime Minister, would (as a best case scenario) get
"stuck" en route to being carried out, or be passed on to the military echelon
and not be carried out as intended or as ordered (as a worse case scenario) or
would not be carried out at all (worst case scenario). The activity logs and
minutes contain dozens of examples, both serious and minor, of such incidents.
For example, during the efforts to reach a cease fire, following one of the
meetings between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Arafat, it was agreed that
Israel will open the 'Tantzer' road and refrain from cutting up the Gaza strip
into two parts. The day went by, night fell, a new day arrived and the Tantzer
road was still closed. The Palestinians called up to protest.
Brigadier-General Gadi Eisenkot, Ehud Barak's Military Secretary, called the
Southern Command. The Southern Command insisted: 'Tantzer' is open. Eisenkot got
back to the Palestinians who continued to insist that the road is closed. Eisenkot
returned to the Southern Command and on and on it went. Finally, the
Palestinians lost their patience. Muhamad Dahlan [the Palestinian Security Chief
at the time] went to the 'Tantzer' road himself and got stuck there among
hundreds of cars and thousands of people because the road was, indeed, closed.
Turned out that the order to open the road did arrive, but the soldiers did not
carry it out. The official excuse: a suspicious object was found at the
checkpoint. No bomb expert who could diffuse it was available. Only by the end
of the day were some bomb experts found. The suspicious object turned out to be
benign. The military establishment - hardly so.
Similar as well as more serious cases happened almost daily. Government orders
were formulated, written down, signed sealed and delivered - nowhere. They
remained neatly filed in their binders. After one of the discussions in [Prime
Minister] Barak's office, there was a follow-up meeting of the military high
command. One of the generals said in response to the operative orders he had
received: "But we were directed by the political branch to cease military
incursions at this point!" Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz replied: "You do what you
think is right, given the facts on the ground. If the political branch chooses
to, it will let you know its objections later."
No wonder therefore that one of the brigade commander, speaking in front of
other officers, dared to say something like the following: "We almost managed to
break them [the Palestinian], but all this kissing up and talk about a cease
fire spoiled it for us." Another brigade commander, Gal Hirsh, said the failure
"to break them" was due to the government decision to allow a cement shipment
into one of the Palestinian towns. Moshe ("Boogy") Ya'alon, who was deputy Chief
of Staff and then head of the Central Command [currently the Chief of Staff -
AK] was heard more than once saying that there was no point talking while
shooting and that any discussion of the a cease fire while the fighting
continues was harmful and unnecessary.
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak [former Chief of Staff and member of Knesset - AK]
coordinated the government cease fire efforts during the initial period [of the
Intifada]. Again and again he would reach a detailed agreement with Dahlan,
only to see it passed on to the military echelons and then totally ignored.
After one too many of these events, Lipkin-Shahak decided he no longer wished to
play this game and resigned.
One who had to go on is the army chief coordinator in the Palestinian
territories, General Yaakov ("Mundy") Orr who put his body on the line trying to
maintain some normalcy and keep the intensity of the conflagration to a
reasonable level. Orr retired at the end of his term, heavily scarred by these
experiences. The people who reported to him in the territories where called
"collaborators" by highly ranked IDF officers [the term 'collaborator' -
complete with a military acronym (the Hebrew "MASHTAF") - refers to Palestinians
informers. They are generally held in utmost contempt by Israeli soldiers who
informally refer to them as "stinkers" - AK]. Again and again, Orr and his men
witnessed how Palestinian perishable farm products, approved [by the Israeli
government] for distribution, get stuck at checkpoints until it was of no use to
anybody. This had very serious consequences, especially when the products were
strawberries or flowers, two export crops that thousands of Palestinian families
in Gaza depend on. If such crops are held for 2-3 days, their commercial value
evaporates.
Another example is the order to supply gas to the Gaza strip via the Gasoline
Terminal. The government issued a clear and precise order to that effect one
evening, only to discover the next day that a military vehicle, dispatched by
the Brigade Commander, is parked at the Gasoline Terminal
preventing the order from being carried out. Someone, somewhere fired some shots
a few hours back and the Brigade Commander decided to halt everything until calm
is restored. [Prime Minister] Ehud Barak delegated authority to Brigade
Commanders on the ground. They, in turn, decided to punish as they saw fit
whoever they felt like punishing, or anyone else in the vicinity, for that
matter.
Similarly, in the first months of the confrontation, IDF bulldozers
indiscriminately razed thousands of dunams of planted farm land, hot-houses,
nurseries, including agricultural equipment, pumps and
tractors under the pretext of "security needs." At the time, Palestinians were
carrying around photographs of houses and goat sheds which were demolished on
top of their herds before they had a chance to evacuate them. The head of the
Southern Command was summoned one day to the Defense Minister after the IDF
uprooted a large grove near Kibbutz Nirim [close to the Gaza
Strip - AK]. Only after all trees were gone was it discovered this was a
kibbutz grove.
At a certain point Efraim Sneh himself has had it. He had several hard talks
with Barak and delivered him a stern letter. Sneh wrote, among other things:
"From the Chief of Staff down to the very last Sergeant at the checkpoints, no
one is carrying out your policies." Sneh, in effect, told Barak that the army
does not take him seriously, that orders are not carried out, that each officer
does what he feels like; that the Chief of Staff, the heads of the main Command
Districts, and really the entire army need to be shaken up; that the policies of
collective punishment and economic strangulation do not serve the political
objectives of the government.
** Prime Minister Barak was Apprehensive **
Barak listened. He saw what was going on, heard what people had to say and
gathered testimonies. Among others, he also had talks, at some point, with high
Palestinian officials who reported to him what was going on in the territories.
"You have no idea what is being done," they told him. Barak was trapped: on the
one hand, he believed in the military system through which he rose up and which
he knew so well, and therefore he gave the army a lot of leeway. On the other
hand, he understood the problem.
Barak was apprehensive and did not want a confrontation with the IDF or with the
Chief of Staff. He could sense the coming elections and knew that such a
confrontation could be damaging. He would say to his military secretary
Brigadier General Gadi Eisenkot from time to time: "Tell the Chief of Staff that
things can't go on like this." "How can I tell the Chief of Staff anything?"
wondered Eisenkot, "he is my commander!" In effect, Eisenkot hinted that it was
Barak who needed to talk to the Chief of Staff.
But Barak continued to nap. At some point, however, even he could take it no
more and he summoned several high ranking officers, among them the Chief of
Staff and the head of the Southern Command, Doron Almog. The discussions were
held in secrecy with very limited attendance to avoid any leaks. People who were
present described the proceedings as "harsh and stern." Barak was described as
someone who arrived "with a loaded gun and a clear threat to shoot anyone who
continues to disobey him straight between the eyes." However, after the threats
were conveyed, those who were reprimanded returned to the territories where
lawlessness continued to reign.
It should be emphasized: what is being said here does not justify or excuse the
Palestinian murderous behavior during the last two years. Nothing can justify or
excuse it. To some extent, the Palestinians got what they deserved. There is no
intention in this article to hold Israel responsible for the eruption of the
riots. This particular coin had two sides, at least. Neither is there an intent
to express a political position here. The IDF was determined to use its power to
the fullest and inflict a heavy price on the Palestinians. It may very well be
that the IDF, wanting to teach the Palestinians a lesson once and for all, a
lesson they will never forget, was right in its approach. History will tell.
The issue is entirely different. In the Israel of 2001 it became clear to
anyone who did not know already that the Israeli army both determines national
policy and executes it. The army is the one to dictate the course of events and
determine their pace and direction. The political echelons have no ability to
discipline the army or keep tabs on its activities. In those difficult days of
September 2000, we found out for sure that Israel is not a state with an army
but an army that has a state as one of its branches. The real executive branch
is not the government but the colossal security system the state has built
around itself over the years. A security system that is exclusively responsible
for all of Israel's Intelligence, but also thinking, planning and control, and
uses these means as it sees fit. During a fateful period like the one which
exploded in our face two years ago, the security system remained outside the
scope of any real control mechanism. Everything depended on the good will of
the system's high officials and the extent to which they had internalized the
values of democracy, rule-bound government, and the law.
In general, Prime Minister Barak kept his cool. But toward the end of his term
he kept zigzagging. He'd issue declarations in the morning only to cancel them
in the evening. He'd preside over long discussions culminating in learned
conclusions, only to file them out of sight barely hours later. And so it
went. But on the whole he did not lose his head even during the most difficult
of times.
His breaking point came when two IDF soldiers were lynched in front of TV
cameras in Ramallah. According to eyewitnesses, Barak went wild. He ordered
F-16 jets to be used against multiple targets simultaneously. In closed
discussions he declared "an Armageddon war." He was furious.
Martin Indick, The USA ambassador to Israel, called and Barak, angrily, refused
to answer. Barak's staff tried as hard as they could, all day long, to calm him
down. Efraim Sneh consulted Yossi Beilin [a principal negotiator at the Taba
talks with the Palestinians in January 2001, former Minister without portfolio,
and currently member of the Knesset - AK] who tried several tactics. Finally,
the F-16 jets were replaced by attack helicopters. That night, Gaza underwent
the heaviest helicopter attack ever; Israel crossed the threshold of restraint
and overnight the conflict escalated by a whole step (or even by an entire
floor).
Current Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Ya'alon said in an interview that he
is "the Chief of Staff for the entire people of Israel." His predecessor, Shaul
Mofaz, said similar things in discrete conversations. "We report to the people
of Israel," our Chiefs of Staff tell us and they are seriously mistaken. They
do not report to the Israeli people. They are appointed civil servants, not
elected officials. They are responsible for the functioning of the army and must
report to the supreme command over the army, which is the government. It is the
Israeli government which must report to the Israeli people that has elected it.
The government must determine the national policy, issue its instructions, draw
the big picture and point the general direction. During the difficult days of
September 2000, and in the subsequent months, Barak's government was not exactly
up to these standards.
Dozens of people, among them security officials and high-ranking officers were
interviewed in the course of preparing this article. Only a few of them were
either politicians or had any political agendas. Most of them were united in
their opinion that the events covered in this article marked Israeli democracy's
darkest days and most difficult hours. Some of the interviewees admit that
occasionally they fear this democracy won't last for long the way things have
been going.