



THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY MUST ASK FOR EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN  
SECURITY FORCES TEMPORARY HELP  
TO STABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION, OVERCOME INTERNAL CHAOS,  
AND ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER

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### Executive Summary

Despite heavy pressures from the international community and from Israel, the P.A. leadership has not taken substantial steps to disarm any of the armed groups, nor succeeded to gain control and enforce law and order over the Palestinian population. It seems there is a little chance that such steps will be taken before the general Parliamentary elections at the end of January 2006.

But what is to be expected after the elections? Success in fulfilling that mission will undoubtedly bring the Palestinians greater sympathy, political and economical support, and will quickly push the relevant parties back to the political negotiating table. But, if **the Palestinian President will not deliver (either in failing to do so, or not even trying)**, we recommend to reinforce the P.A. with selected foreign security units, for a limited period of time.

The preferred option is the use an **Egyptian force in Gaza and Jordanian force in the West Bank**. This seems the right match, as this will probably be the preferred Palestinian choice; since all parties share the same culture and language; there are close friendly relations between the leaderships of the P.A., Egypt and Jordan; the security apparatuses of both Egypt and Jordan are familiar with the Palestinian populations, terrains, the different security forces and their commanders; they share open borders while the geographical proximity allows minimal expenses in replacing, reinforcing or cutting the size of the active units. Past experiences of the Jordanian military in international peace keeping activities can contribute as well. Above all, the Egyptians and Jordanians have a strategic interest to be involved in the Palestinian

territories, being the P.A.'s neighbors. Egypt and Jordan both have a direct interest in containing the power and capacity of radical forces from influencing and infiltrating their own territories. As for Israel - having peace agreements with both Egypt and Jordan, the Government of Israel might not object such an initiative that involves those two Arab states.

The use of Egyptian and Jordanian forces can significantly help the P.A. in stabilizing the internal and external security situation, as well as reinforcing law and order. At the same time, this will allow the Palestinian security forces to conclude the processes of rebuilding, reorganizing, and achieving operational capabilities, needed to gain full responsibility over the P.A. territories. On top of it, such an initiative might contribute to achieve a more successful and effective Palestinian governance, that will gain control in Gaza and the West Bank.

If this happens, it will have an immediate direct positive impact on Israeli decision makers and public opinion. Likewise, Palestinian success in enforcing law and order, will also impact positively on increasing the sympathy of the international community, which will be ready to translate political support into a renewed global concerted effort of economical assistance, and to push the political process forward within the framework of the Road Map.

## **Introduction**

The Oslo peace process was designed as a gradual incremental plan to transfer occupied territories from Israeli control to a Palestinian Authority. Doing so, it was hoped, would demonstrate its ability to govern, provide services to the public and develop a new relationship with Israel that would enhance trust and lead to further Israeli withdrawals.

Unfortunately, The grand Oslo Plan crashed, as it's basic assumptions failed to stand the test of reality: Trust between Israel and the P.A. was not developed; both sides did not fully implement their obligations; Israel did not implement its Road Map commitments regarding settlements, outposts and redeployment of forces; good governance did not emerge in Palestine; and instead of a mutually beneficial process, that would provide more peace and more security for both sides, security and peace dissipated into violence and destruction.

Looking at the P.A. it seems that despite heavy pressures from the international community and from Israel, the Authority's leadership neither took substantial steps to disarm any of the armed groups, nor succeeded to gain control and enforce law and order over the Palestinian territory's population.

The Palestinian Authority was not able to fulfill most of its obligations, due to the following obstacles:

1- The newly elected President has not yet received sufficient support internally and inherited a corrupt system which has led to a loss of confidence from the public in the Authority and its different institutions.

2- The chaotic situation within the Palestinian security apparatuses has continued to prevail with anarchy between competing security forces and personalities.

3- The absence of serious planning and a lack of personnel to carry out the reforms including a lack of discipline and a clear chain of command have compounded the difficulties.

4- The short life time of the current Palestinian regime was not enough to bring substantial achievements.

5- The influence of the "Old Guard" inside the Palestinian institutions have created contradicting conflict of interests between the P.L.O and the P.A. over the authorities and the institutions and have further complicated chances for internal cohesion.

6- The financial aid still has not reached the level needed to fulfill significant changes.

7- Israel's less than generous attitude towards the Palestinian Authority has further weakened chances of success.

It seems there is little chance that the necessary steps will be taken before the Parliamentary elections at the end of January 2006. Furthermore, President Mahmoud Abbas is interested in avoiding any conflict with Hamas and other armed groups that might lead to internal bloodshed. Being supported by the U.S. the Palestinian President stands still, doing too little to improve personal and public internal and external security situation.

There is a great question mark, whether Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian regime will take the responsibility to carry out this mission after the elections, as expected from any executive body, no matter what the results of the elections will be. The occupation continues to hold overall authority and the Palestinians lack full authority presenting additional barriers from the Palestinians taking direct and decisive control. The violent events that have permeated throughout the "Fatah" primaries elections, as well as the terror attack in Netanya proved the acute and urgent need to engage in this challenge. The security challenge is, however, unavoidable, either for the Palestinian people, who suffer lack of stability so badly, or for meeting Israel's and the world's expectations to stop terror activities and eliminate its infrastructures, as preconditions for going back to the Road Map track.

This unsolved question might be answered using one of the next two schools of thought:

According to the first one, great amounts of resources and efforts were invested lately in the process of reconstructing and training the Palestinian security forces yet Abbas continues to refuse to take the required measures; it isn't because his troops are not able to do so, but because he does not want to endanger, in any way, his public support and avoids the risks of possible civil war.

The second school of thought is that there is a real lack of capacity and capability to confront the armed groups. According to this theory, the Palestinian security forces are not capable of fulfilling their missions and this is why the political decision makers avoid ordering them to do so.

The picture will probably be clearer at the end of January – beginning of February. If the Palestinian President will start acting by taking decisive and direct action against Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Fatah armed groups, he will be widely respected, and get the blessing of the international community. Success in fulfilling that mission might bring much greater sympathy and economic support to the Palestinian Authority and – as the Palestinians themselves expect - quickly push the relevant parties back to the negotiating table. But, if things will go the other way around, and **the Palestinian President will not deliver (either in failing to do so, or not even trying) creative thinking and new ideas will be needed to avoid deeper future crisis and wide scaled escalation.**

**This paper deals with this scenario.** If the P.A. will not handle the internal security problems and instability with direct and decisive actions, it seems appropriate to recommend the use of selected foreign security units to reinforce the Palestinian forces for a certain-limited period of time. The deployment of friendly foreign troops will assist in easing the mission of the Palestinians forces. The PA forces will then be able to complete all the needed processes of rebuilding, training and absorbing operational capabilities. This paper concentrates only on the principles of operating such foreign security forces. Its basic assumption is that by assisting in carrying out the security tasks, tensions within the Palestinian society may be eased and allow the curing of other urgent needs of the Palestinian society, like improving the overall economic situation, strengthening the educational system, carrying out governmental

reforms, pushing forward the processes of institutions building, and the legislation of a national constitution.

### **Key Guidelines**

If the Palestinian Authority would find it beneficial to receive serious foreign assistance in implementing its immense security obligations, its leadership should, of course, appeal the international community - the U.N. or the Quartet - and ask for the deployment of a special task force. Such a task force must be capable of fulfilling operational responsibilities including taking actions on the ground.

The idea of bringing in foreign forces to the P.A. territories must be fully accepted not only by the Palestinian Authority, but also by the Government of Israel. Israeli reservations will mostly relate to the limitations that will be imposed on the IDF by the presence of Egyptian and Jordanian troops, however, an improved security situation on the ground enforced by the foreign troops will also rendered the need of Israel to intervene to a much lower level. The entire mission should be approved by the governments of participating states and be accepted as a U.N. Security Council resolution.

The deployment of reinforcing security forces within the territories of the P.A. can best rely on neighboring Arab states. Non-Arab foreign involvement might be perceived by the Palestinians (and many others) as repeating the appearance of colonial occupation forces in the Middle East. To the best of our judgment, the preferred option will be the use an **Egyptian forces in Gaza and Jordanian forces in the West Bank**. This seems the right match, as all parties share the same culture and language; there are close friendly relations between the leaderships of the P.A., Egypt and Jordan; the security apparatuses of both Egypt and Jordan are familiar with the Palestinian populations, Palestinian terrains and the different Palestinian security forces and their commanders; they share open borders while the geographical proximity allows minimal expenses in replacing, reinforcing or cutting the size of the active units. Past experiences of the Jordanian military in international peace keeping activities can contribute as well. And above all – the Egyptians and Jordanians have strategic interests to be involved in the Palestinian territories, being

the P.A.'s neighbors and thereby helping to create more regional security and stability.

The commander of any foreign force on Palestinian territory will be the Palestinian President, Government and Parliament. They will assign the supporting forces' missions and the nature of their activities. The P.A. formal institutions will have the authority to reconsider the length of the foreign forces' mandate, and to remove them in case it contradicts Palestinian interests.

The reinforcing foreign units will operate under the coordination of an international umbrella that will facilitate and finance this mission. It would be best if the United Nations would take responsibility over the endeavor to be considered as a peace keeping operation. It is also recommended to consider the possibility that the new US General (Dayton) appointed by the US President with a yet to be defined "expanded mandate" could be involved in the role of coordinating the mission between the PA, the Jordanians, Egyptians and the Israelis.

There will be no functional connections between these forces and other foreign elements operating in Palestinian territories, either advisers who work with the Palestinian security forces; observers; or Europeans who are, or will be involved in supervising the operations of the P.A.'s different border crossings.

The foreign forces mandate will last three years, during which the P.A. will finalize all processes needed to operate independently in every security aspect. The mandate will be renewed every year, by the P.A., the U.N.; and the governments of Egypt and Jordan.

Since the mission of the reinforcing units is to help in stabilizing the security situation within Palestinian territories, they will be subordinate to the Palestinian Minister of Interior. Those forces will operate separately from the Palestinian security forces, either functionally (they will not be subordinate to Palestinian field units and commanders); or geographically - they will have separate districts of responsibility, where they act independently, with no Palestinian interference at the field level. They

will deploy in separate camps, organized for them in advance by the Palestinian authorities, and assisted by other foreign parties.

The special nature of the troops' mission will dictate whether military forces will be preferable, or police units, or the combination of them both. The reinforcing units will be equipped with all necessary equipment including light weapons that will be agreed upon by the parties, including Israel.

**Estimated forces size:** a brigade ("Liwa") for Gaza and a division ("Firka") for the West Bank. The P.A. is authorized to reduce the forces' size, but need the parties' approval to increase it (including Israeli approval).

## **Conclusion**

In the case that the P.A. will not be able to fulfill its mission and stabilize the security situation in the territories after the elections to the Palestinian Parliament it is advised to consider the use of Egyptian and Jordanian forces to help stand the challenge. Doing so for a certain limited period of time can significantly help the P.A. in stabilizing the internal and external security situation, as well as in reinforcing law and order. At the same time, this will allow the Palestinian security forces to quietly conclude all processes of rebuilding, reorganizing, and achieving operational capabilities needed to gain full responsibility over the P.A. territories.

Furthermore we have good reasons to believe that such an initiative might contribute to achieve more successful and effective Palestinian governance that will gain control in Gaza and the West Bank. If this happens, it will have an immediate direct positive impact on Israeli decision makers and public opinion. Likewise, Palestinian success in enforcing law and order will also impact positively on increasing the sympathy of the Palestinian public and the international community, which will be ready to translate political support into a renewed global concerted effort of economical help, and to push the political process forward.