Too much of what is commonly known about the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is generated by the constant repetition of truisms that
fit the justifications of one side’s explanations. Too few of us
bother to weigh the possibility that there might be another
interpretation of reality. If so, it might also suggest that our
own may not be the exclusive version of truth.
I am writing this article on the basis of two pieces that
appeared in this newspaper. The first, the article entitled
“Proximity? It’s a start” from March 4, and a more recent
article by Ben Dror Yemini – “A Fatal Blow to peace” on April
7. Both are filled with peace process truisms that have become
cornerstones of Israeli popular thought. I will challenge them.
The March 4 piece states: “...that this time the Palestinians
will reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence and negotiate
for a viable settlement accordingly...” It is a well-known fact
that the Palestinians have never really recognized Israel.
Correct? Actually, no. Even in the Palestinian National
Conference in November 1988 the PLO accepted the two-state
solution as their strategic choice, reconciling themselves to
the fact that Palestine would be established on only 22 percent
of the land between the river and the sea. In September 13, 1993
Yasser Arafat exchanged letters of mutual recognition with prime
minister Yitzhak Rabin. Arafat stated: “The PLO recognizes the
right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.”
In return Rabin wrote to Arafat that “the government of Israel
has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the
Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within
the Middle East peace process” (hardly a balanced act of
mutuality – we received recognition of our state and they
received recognition of their leadership).
Surely the editors of The Jerusalem Post and Yemini would claim
that the Palestinians never recognized Israel as the
nation-state of the Jewish people, but only the existence of
Israel. This is perhaps true, but until the Annapolis summit of
November 2007 there was never an Israeli demand that the
Palestinians recognize the Jewishness of Israel. Nor has Israel
made that demand from any other state that we have diplomatic
relations with – not even from Egypt or Jordan.
Most Palestinians view this demand as a new hurdle they are
being forced to jump over when they have never received any
Israeli assurance regarding their own national rights. They also
see it as a trick to remove the refugee issue from the
negotiating table, and as a means to facilitate plans from the
likes of Avigdor Lieberman to expel the Palestinian citizens of
Israel who are living on their own land for generations.
Of course it would be nice if the Palestinians recognized that
the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. It
would please me personally, especially if we could say that it
is the national-state of the Jewish people and of all of its
citizens, but I can also live and make peace with the
Palestinian people sufficing with their state-to-state
recognition of Israel as neighbors seeking to live side by side
in peace. The Jewishness of Israel will be decided by the Jews
who are Israelis and not by the Palestinians.
BOTH THE editorial and Yemini relate in detail to the
Palestinian refusal to accept Ehud Barak’s “generous” offer in
Camp David in July 2000. To this point I would like to use the
tools of simple rational thought and then present some facts
about what was really offered.
Camp David was convened after Barak demanded from Bill Clinton
that he head a summit of the leaders. At the 14-day summit,
Barak actually refused to negotiate directly with Arafat, and
there were no direct Barak-Arafat negotiations. When the summit
concluded as a failure, after agreeing that negotiations would
continue and that no blame would be placed on one of the
parties, both Clinton and Barak praised each other and Arafat
took the blame for the failure.
But even after the second intifada exploded in the end of
September 2000, negotiations continued. In January 2001 another
summit was held in Taba (this time without the leaders) and
substantial progress toward an agreement was achieved. Between
Camp David and Taba, the negotiating teams met 52 times. The
Taba “offer” came a lot closer to reaching an agreement than at
Camp David – so where is the logic that Camp David composed the
most generous offer possible?
The truth is that no Palestinian in the world could have
accepted the Camp David offer. It was composed of 89% of the
West Bank with two Israeli sovereign west-east corridors cutting
the Palestinian state into three cantons, with Israeli
sovereignty over all of Palestine’s external borders – what the
Palestinians called a “sovereign cage.” Additionally the offer
did not include any Palestinian sovereignty inside Jerusalem
with the exception of the outlying neighborhoods, and no
Palestinian control over the al-Aksa Mosque. Camp David exploded
when Barak demanded to build a synagogue on the Temple Mount.
The Taba talks were based on the Clinton parameters issued at
the end of December 2000. As a member of Barak’s team of experts
on Jerusalem prior to Taba, we were told by Barak to design our
proposals on the basis of the political division of Jerusalem
according to Clinton. Although it took Arafat 18 months to
formally accept the Clinton proposals, his team at Taba was also
instructed to work on the basis of the Clinton parameters. Great
progress was made in Taba, but it ended before it could reach
agreement because it took place 10 days before elections that
brought Ariel Sharon to power and Barak had no public legitimacy
by that point.
BOTH THE opinion piece and Yemini expand on Ehud Olmert’s offer
to Mahmoud Abbas. Yemini states that Abbas rejected it because
it fell short on the refugee issue, stating that he “demanded a
mass right of return.” In the Palestinian narrative there was no
real offer. Olmert’s offer was leaked to the Israeli press along
with the Palestinian rejection. Abbas’s spokesman responded:
“Olmert’s plan showed a lack of seriousness.” Later Abbas also
commented that the gaps were too wide.
Interestingly, both Abbas and Olmert now say that with more time
it would have been possible to reach an agreement. They both say
they found a partner on the other side. Surprisingly they both
concur that the main obstacle was not Jerusalem or refugees, but
territory.
Lastly, it is
essential to deal with the so-called Palestinian refusal to
enter negotiations until there is a settlement freeze. Both the
editorial and Yemini stress this point repeatedly. They say that
the Palestinians never demanded such a freeze in the past and
always negotiated while Israel built more settlements. That is
true, and that is why Palestinians believe it must be stopped
now.
Even with Palestinian refusal to enter negotiations while
settlement building continues, there has never been a better
partner for peace on the Palestinian side than there is today.
The main problem is that there is no real partner for peace in
Jerusalem.
The writer is co-CEO of the
Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (www.ipri.org)
and an elected member of the leadership of the Green Movement
party. |